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XIAOMI CORPORATION V. U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE:
DEFENDING THE INTERNATIONAL
EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS
ACT
BAILEY WILLIAMS
The United States Constitution fails to prescribe procedures
Congress and the President must follow during a national emergency.
Consequently, history demonstrates that Presidents must either act
without congressional approval during a crisis pursuant to the
amorphous “executive powers” conferred by the Constitution, or
Congress may enact statutes ex-ante that provide the President with
emergency powers in anticipation of future crises.1 Since the midtwentieth century the latter method has prevailed, with Congress
enacting dozens of statutes permitting the President to declare a state
of emergency and exercise certain delegated emergency powers
therein.2
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”)
represents one example of Congress delegating emergency authority to
the President in the realm of foreign affairs and national security.3
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1. Compare The Brig Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. 635, 668 (1862) (holding President Lincoln
acted within his Constitutional powers when he issued blockades during the Civil War absent any
“special legislative authority”), with Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 674 (1981) (holding
President Carter acted within his statutory power delegated to him pursuant to congressional
authorization) (emphasis added).
2. BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, CHECKING THE PRESIDENT’S SANCTIONS POWERS 3
(2021) [hereinafter Brennan Center Report] (noting that there are upwards of 120 statutory
powers the U.S. President can invoke when declaring a national emergency); see also Amy L.
Stein, A Statutory National Security President, 70 FLA. L. REV. 1183, 1193 (2018) (explaining that
nearly 400 statutes “discuss national security authority provided to the President,” and more than
60 grant the President “explicit power to act in the name of national security.”).
3. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1707.
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IEEPA provides the President with the power to declare a state of
emergency and affords the President sweeping economic powers
during the declared emergency.4
Specifically, IEEPA grants the President the authority to freeze
assets, block transactions subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States, and exercise numerous other powers to regulate international
commerce.5
Supported by a broad statutory delegation of power, courts have
placed very few substantive limitations on a President acting under
IEEPA.6 Yet, a recent decision by the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia reveals the broad and flexible power IEEPA
delegates to the Executive is not without limits.7 In Xiaomi Corporation
v. Department of Defense, the D.C. District Court enjoined the
implementation and enforcement of an executive order issued by the
Trump Administration acting under the authority of IEEPA.8 The
Xiaomi decision represents a departure from the judiciary’s traditional
deference to the Executive when acting pursuant to IEEPA and
presents a compelling case study to consider both the scope of, and
limits on, executive power.
This Note focuses on the tripart tension between our
Constitutionally mandated separation of powers, the Executive’s
expanding authority in the realm of national security, and the evolving
nature of global conflict that is increasingly defined by economic and
financial warfare.9 Specifically, this Note contemplates the advantages
4. CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY et al., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45618, THE INTERNATIONAL
EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWER ACT: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND USE 2, 17 (2020) [hereinafter
Congressional Research Report on IEEPA] (noting that the President often turns to IEEPA to
“impose economic sanctions in furtherance of U.S. foreign policy and national security
objectives.”).
5. 50 U.S.C. § 1702; see also Congressional Research Report on IEEPA, supra note 4, at
25–26 (noting that the President has “turned to IEEPA to impose economic sanctions in
furtherance of U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.”); see also Brennan Center
Report, supra note 2, at 7 (noting that IEEPA allows the President to “‘regulate’ a wide array of
financial transactions.”).
6. See Brennan Center Report, supra note 2, at 33 (noting that most challenges to executive
actions taken during a declared national security emergency under IEEPA have failed, and “[t]he
few challenges that succeeded did not seriously undermine the overarching statutory scheme for
sanctions.”).
7. Xiaomi Corporation, et al., v. Department of Defense, No. 21-280 (RC), 2021 WL 950144
(D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2021).
8. Id. at *1, *7.
9. See Paul Bracken, Financial Warfare, 51 ORBIS 685, 696 (2007) (“Financial warfare is
likely to be an increasing form of conflict because it lies at the intersection of powerful long term
trends in technology, networks, and finance.”); see also JUAN C. ZARATE, TREASURY’S WAR:
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of the Executive’s broad authority to wield global capital markets as a
foreign policy tool and considers the judiciary’s role in policing
Executive Branch activity when acting pursuant to congressionally
delegated power. To this end, the Xiaomi decision provides a useful
framework for evaluating both the Executive’s expansive national
security power and arguments for reining in executive power under
IEEPA. Using the Xiaomi decision as an analytical framework, this
Note rejects calls for IEEPA reform and argues IEEPA’s existing
statutory accountability mechanisms, in addition to proper judicial
review under the Administrative Procedure Act,10 represent sufficient
constraints on the President’s delegated national security powers.
Accordingly, this Note will proceed in four parts. Part I will provide
an overview of the President’s national security power and the various
sources giving rise to that power. This section will also demonstrate the
historical precedent for the President’s broad discretion in the foreign
policy realm. Thereafter, Part II will provide an overview of IEEPA and
will consider how the evolving nature of national security to include
economic warfare has impacted the Executive’s national security
power over time.
Following Part I and II’s suggestion that the Executive’s national
security power has expanded over time, Part III will use the Xiamoi
case to demonstrate the existing constraints on the Executive’s national
security powers. Finally, Part IV will bring each of these elements
together and will argue that IEEPA should not be amended to create
more Congressional oversight. This section will reject arguments for
IEEPA reform and will use the Xiaomi decision to argue that IEEPA
sensibly constrains the President when paired with appropriate judicial
review, particularly in an era defined by the growing prominence of
financial warfare as a U.S. foreign policy tool.11
I. THE NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENT
There has been extensive academic literature focusing on the
breadth and derivation of the Executive’s national security power.12
THE UNLEASHING OF A NEW ERA OF FINANCIAL WARFARE 2–3 (2013) (“This new warfare is
defined by the use of financial tools, pressure, and market forces to isolate rogue actors from the
international financial and commercial systems and gain leverage over our enemies.”).
10. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706.
11. See discussion infra Part II.
12. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign
Affairs, 111 YALE L. J. 231, 256–57 (2001) (arguing that the Vesting Clause creates the President’s
foreign affairs power). But see Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power
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While the debate is far from settled, most scholars agree that the text
of the Constitution does little to help resolve disagreements
surrounding the source and scope of the Executive’s national security
power.13 It is beyond the scope of this Note to assess the various
constitutional arguments for a more limited or expansive executive
power. Instead, this section will briefly survey the relevant legal
doctrine and emphasize the key Supreme Court decisions that
established the modern approach to the Executive’s national security
power. This Section will show that, over time, judicial deference and
congressional delegation have strengthened the President’s power in
the realm of national security and foreign affairs.14
A. Inherent Presidential Power
The Constitution grants the President “executive power”—a
bundle of undefined, nebulous, and circumstantial privileges
historically interpreted to give the President broad authority in the
realm of foreign affairs and national security.15 Given that the
Constitution provides only a select few explicit national security
powers to the Executive,16 the President’s authority over foreign affairs
Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545 (2004) (refuting Prakash and Ramsey’s
Vesting Clause thesis). For opposing sides of this debate, compare Francis P. Sempa, The Wartime
Presidency, 26 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 25, 28–29 (2009) (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (“the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President
as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations– a power which
does not requires a basis for its exercise an act of Congress . . . .”) (emphasis added)) (explaining
that, historically, executive power is understood to give “broad” implied powers to the President,
particularly in the arena of foreign affairs), with Julian Davis Mortenson, Article II Vests the
Executive Power, Not the Royal Prerogative, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1169, 1172–73 (2019) (rejecting
the “conventional wisdom” that views the Vesting Clause “as a powerful presumption of
indefeasible presidential authority in the arenas of foreign affairs and national security.”)
(emphasis added).
13. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 12, at 233 (“…the foreign affairs Constitution
contains enormous gaps that must be filled by reference to extratextual source… .”).
14. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs:
Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L. J. 1255, 1311–12 (1988) (arguing the judiciary’s
deference to the Executive branch has expanded the implied power of the President over foreign
affairs); see also MICHAEL A. GENOVESE & DAVID GRAY ADLER, THE WAR POWER IN AN AGE
OF TERRORISM 24 (2017) (noting that Congress has abdicated its role in making U.S. foreign
policy and delegated vast power to the President).
15. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America.”); see also ELAINE HALCHIN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R98505,
NATIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS 1 (2021) [hereinafter Congressional Research Report on
National Emergency Powers] (explaining that the President has “certain powers that may be
exercised in the event that the nation is threatened by crisis,” and these powers may be “stated
explicitly or implied by the Constitution, assumed by the Chief Executive to be permissible
constitutionally, or inferred from or specified by statute.”).
16. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (assigning the President the title of Command-in-Chief of
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and national security is primarily an implied power.17 Over time, the
judiciary has provided the clearest articulation of the scope of the
President’s implied national security powers.
The Supreme Court first considered the breadth of the President’s
implied national security powers in Little v. Barreme.18 This early case
considered damages liability for an American military officer who
seized a Danish vessel during hostilities with the French.19 The case
turned on whether the U.S. officer, Captain Little, could avoid damages
liability when acting pursuant to an executive order issued by the
President that directly conflicted with an act of Congress.20 The Court
held that Little could not be immunized by an executive order when,
without such an order, his actions “would have been a plain trespass”
under legislation passed by Congress.21 Additionally, with respect to
executive power, the Court held the President cannot use his implied
constitutional authority to take actions contrary to the express terms of
a law passed by Congress.22 Rather, when Congress has directly spoken
on an issue through legislation that provides the Executive with a
specific authority, and Congress has prescribed the manner in which the
law should be executed, the Executive may not act beyond that
authority.23
the armed forces).
17. See GENOVESE & ADLER, supra note 14, at 1 (noting that the tradition of constitutional
interpretation that has resulted in so-called implied powers); see also David M. Driesen & William
C. Banks, Implied Presidential and Congressional Powers, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1301, 1303 (2020)
(noting that the President’s power over foreign affairs and national security is “primarily an
implied power. . . .”).
18. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
19. Id. at 176.
20. Id. at 176–77; see also Michael J. Glennon, Two Views of Presidential Foreign Affairs
Power: Little v. Barreme or Curtiss-Wright?, 13 YALE J. INT’L. L. 5, 6–7 (1988) (summarizing the
facts of Little v. Barreme).
21. See Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 177–78 (explaining that, while Congress had passed a
statute during hostilities with the French that permitted the President to give order to
commanders of armed vessels to seize vessels, the President’s order to Little fell outside the scope
of his authority under the statute).
22. See id. (noting that “the fifth section [of the relevant statute] gives a special authority [to
the President] to seize on the high seas, and limits that authority to the seizure of vessels bound
or sailing to a French port . . . .”); see also David Gray Adler, The Steel Seizure Case and Inherent
Presidential Power, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 155, 194 (2002) (discussing the impact of Little Barreme
on the court’s approach in Youngstown).
23. See Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 177–78 (“But when it is observed that the general clause
of the first section of [the legislation] . . . obviously contemplates a seizure within the United States,
and that the fifth section gives [the Executive] a special authority to seize on the high seas, and
limits that authority to the seizure of vessels bound or sailing to a French port, the legislature
seem to have prescribed . . . the manner in which this law shall be carried into execution . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
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While the Little decision purports to limit executive power over
national security, the decision alludes to a more expansive
interpretation of the President’s national security power. In dicta,
Justice Marshall opined that, consistent with the President’s role as
commander-in-chief and with his duty to “take care that the laws be
faithfully executed,”24 the President may have the implied
Constitutional authority to order seizures on the high seas during a
conflict absent a statutory prohibition imposed by Congress.25 Rather,
Justice Marshall suggested that the President might have had an
implied power to seize vessels during hostilities if Congress had not so
pointedly placed limits on the President’s authority in the relevant
statutory language.26
The Court relied on similar legal principals more than a century
later in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.27 There, the Court held
President Truman did not have the authority to seize and operate the
steel mills during a nationwide labor strike because he was not acting
pursuant to statute and did not have the inherent constitutional
authority as Commander in Chief to expropriate private enterprise for
public use.28 The majority in Youngstown held that Congress’ failure to
grant the President express authority to seize the steel mills was
dispositive.29 Both Justices Jackson and Frankfurter, however,
suggested different bases for implying executive authority absent
express congressional authorization.30 Specifically, Justice Jackson’s
24. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
25. See id. (“It is by no means clear that the President of the United States, whose high duty
it is to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed,’ and who is commander in chief of the armies
and navies of the United States, might not, without any special authority for that purpose . . . have
empowered the officers commanding the armed vessels of the United States to seize . . . .”). This
holding is easily reconcilable with the court’s holding in Youngstown, as the facts of the
President’s exercise of the “Commander in Chief” power in Little were in the context of war and
foreign conflict, as opposed to nationalization of domestic industry in Youngstown.
26. See id. (considering whether the President would have had the authority to issue
Executive Order to Little and other Naval captains had Congress remained completely silent on
the issue).
27. 343 U.S. 579, 585–86 (1952).
28. Id. at 587–88 (finding the President’s seizure of the steel mills “cannot properly be
sustained as an exercise of the President's military power as Commander in Chief of the Armed
Forces” and adding the “seizure order be sustained because of the several constitutional
provisions that grant executive power to the President.”).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 635–38 (Jackson, J., concurring), 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (chronicling
the main arguments of Justice Jackson and Frankfurter’s concurrences – the former suggesting an
implied presidential power depending on the “disjunction or conjunction” of the President’s
power with will of Congress, and the latter arguing constitutional custom and long-standing
executive practice are a source of implied presidential power).
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famed concurring opinion argued that, absent express legislative
authority, the President may find authority to act from congressional
silence or implied congressional consent.31 In this way, Justice Jackson
hinted that the President may act pursuant to his amorphous,
constitutionally vested executive power when Congress has neither
expressly authorized nor prohibited the President to carry out the act
in question.32
Together, Little and Youngstown suggest there is an undefined
space in which the President may act pursuant to his implied executive
authority without Congressional approval. More importantly for the
below analysis, both opinions emphasize the importance of
congressional delegation of power through statute. First, Little reveals
the Executive’s implied national security powers do not allow him to
take actions that violate the express terms of a law passed by Congress.
Second, implied by the Youngstown majority and explicitly written in
Jackson’s concurrence, executive power is at its strongest when the
President acts pursuant to an express authorization from Congress.33
Restated, when acting pursuant to statute, the President’s national
security power is “supported by the strongest of presumptions and the
widest latitude of judicial interpretation.”34
B. Modern Statutory National Security Power
As a result of the legal history chronicled above, the President
typically acts pursuant to a statutory authorization from Congress in
the context of modern national security decisions. Yet, in addition, the
President often cites the Executive’s broad implied national security
power alongside Congress’ statutory authorization to support a given
31. See id. at 635–38 (Jackson, J., concurring) (endorsing an “implied executive power,” the
scope of which changes based on how closely the President’s actions are tethered to the will of
Congress).
32. See id. at 637 (describing the so-called “twilight zone” as an area in which the President
may “rely upon his own independent powers” when there is neither “a congressional grant or
denial of authority”).
33. See id. at 635 (“When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization
of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right
plus all that Congress can delegate.”).
34. Id. at 637. The Court’s decision in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 318–20 (1936) also supports the notion that the President has sweeping authority to act
in the realm of national security when acting pursuant to statute. This case shows that, even before
Youngstown, the Court was extremely deferential to the President when acting (1) in the realm
of foreign affairs and national security, and (2) pursuant to some grant of Congressional
delegation. But see Koh, supra note 14, at 1306–07 (arguing that Presidents have sought to use
Curtis-Wright “to add to the powers enumerated [in the Constitution] an indeterminate reservoir
of executive foreign affairs authority.”).
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action or decision.35 It is the job of the judiciary to parse these parallel
sources of power and determine if an executive action is grounded in
the Constitution, or if the President is acting pursuant to a
congressional delegation. Depending on the subject matter before the
Court, however, the judiciary often speaks of executive power in
sweeping terms without scrutinizing the source of that authority,
leading to inconsistent legal conclusions on the scope of the President’s
national security power.36
This Section demonstrates that the modern understanding of the
Executive’s broad national security power arose from a two-step
process. First, a reform-minded Congress delegated vast authority to
the President in the realm of national security. Second, the federal
judiciary broadly interpreted Congress’ statutory delegations. As
demonstrated below, the Court has applied “extraordinary” statutory
construction to congressional delegations of national security power
and, in doing so, has expanded the President’s power over national
security and foreign affairs.37
1. Congressional Delegation
Much of the Executive’s national security power arises from
express authority delegated to the President by statute.38 Indeed, one
quantitative analysis found that nearly “400 statutes discuss national
security authority provided to the President,” and more than sixty
statues grant the President “explicit power to act in the name of
national security.”39 Congress passed many of these statutory
delegations in the late 1970s and early 1980s during the post-Watergate
era—a period defined by a renewed appetite for transparency and
accountability. While many of these statutes purported to constrain the

35. See Exec. Order No. 14,032, 86 Fed. Reg. 30,145 (June 3, 2021) (titled “Addressing the
Threat From Securities Investments That Finance Certain Companies of the People’s Republic
of China”) (arguing that the President is taking executive action pursuant to both (1) the authority
vested in him by the Constitution and (2) IEEPA – a statutory delegation).
36. See Stein, supra note 2, at 1186 (explaining that “[r]egardless of the source of the
President's national security authority,” whether it be the implied power or statutory
authorization, the Executive and Judiciary often cite general notions about “the amount of
deference given to the President on national security issues” rather than “clearly distinguish
presidential actions that are grounded in statutory powers from those grounded in constitutional
powers.”).
37. See Driesen & Banks, supra note 17, at 1328–29 (explaining that the “Court often
suspends the ordinary rules of statutory construction in order to grant the President broad implied
authority over foreign affairs . . . .”).
38. Koh, supra note 14, at 1263.
39. Stein, supra note 2, at 1193.
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President’s national security power with elaborate procedural
restraints,40 Congress also passed “substantial fresh delegations of
foreign affairs authority” to the President.41 By congressional design,
this period of legislative reform shifted the policy making power over
national security issues from Congress to the Executive.42
2. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation
A series of Supreme Court opinions upholding and expanding the
President’s authority over foreign affairs and national security issues
accompanied congressional delegation of national security power to
the President.43 Modern caselaw demonstrates the Court’s dominant
trend has been to defer to the Executive when the President acts
pursuant to express or implied statutory authority.44 As shown below,
the Court has generously construed statutory language, including
congressional silence, to find statutory authority for a President acting
in the realm of national security.
Dames & Moore v. Regan embodies one approach the Supreme
Court has used to analyze executive action in the national security
sphere.45 Here, in response to the Iranian Hostage Crisis, President
Carter declared a national emergency pursuant IEEPA and issued an
executive order freezing Iranian assets in the United States.46 Acting
within the scope of the executive order, the Treasury Department then

40. See Koh, supra note 14, at 1263–66 (describing this period as the “post-Vietnam flow of
foreign affairs power from Congress to the Executive.”).
41. Id. at 1264. New delegations of statutory authority falling into this category include the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1706 (1982); National
Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1651 (1982); Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2487
(1982); Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401–2413 (1982); Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1811 (1982); and International Security Assistance and Arms
Export Control Act of 1976, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751–2796 (1982).
42. See GENOVESE & ADLER, supra note 14, at 6, 24 (noting that “presidents [have] made
grander and grander claims of unilateral, independent power. . . .” and “While the Constitution
established a shared model of policymaking, over time presidents have grabbed, and Congress
has often willingly given to presidents, a wide range of power over foreign affairs and war.”); see
also Koh, supra note 14, at 1319 (describing the U.S. foreign policy making system as one
“overdominated by the Executive.”).
43. See Koh, supra note 14, at 1264, 1305–06.
44. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–36 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). This trend of judicial deference is consistent with Justice Jackson’s view that the
President’s “authority is at its maximum” when “the President acts pursuant to an express or
implied authorization of Congress.”
45. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
46. See id. at 662–64 (explaining the circumstances of the Iranian Hostage Crisis and the
executive action taken in response to the crisis).
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authorized prejudgment attachments against Iran in federal court.47
Petitioner Dames & Moore sued Iranian defendants and secured a prejudgment attachment of Iranian assets.48
Thereafter, the American hostages in Tehran were released
pursuant to a diplomatic agreement in which the U.S. agreed to
terminate ongoing legal proceedings and nullify existing judgments
between U.S. persons and Iranian institutions in federal court.49 As a
result, the district court vacated Dame & Moore’s prejudgment
attachment against the Iranian defendants.50 Petitioners then
commenced litigation against the United States, arguing the President
and the Secretary of the Treasury acted outside of their statutory and
constitutional powers.51
Here, Congress had not legislated with respect to the President’s
power to nullify legal claims in U.S. courts through executive order.52
Despite this, the Court used IEEPA and other ancillary statutes to infer
congressional approval for the President to nullify legal claims.53 While
the Court found that no statute provides specific authorization to the
President to suspend claims in federal court, the majority gleaned
congressional approval for the Executive to do so from a bundle of
statutes that indicated “congressional acceptance of a broad scope for
executive action” in the national security context.54 In sum, because (1)
the President was acting in the realm of foreign affairs when he issued
an executive order suspending legal claims against Iran, and (2)
Congress previously delegated power enabling the Executive to settle
47. See id. at 663–64 (noting that “the President granted a general license authorizing certain
judicial proceedings against Iran,” and clarified in a later executive order that the previous
authorization permitting judicial proceedings against Iran included prejudgment attachment).
48. Id.
49. See id. at 664–65 (explaining that the deal reached between the U.S. and Iran, via
executive order, required the United States to “terminate all legal proceedings in involving claims
of United States persons and institutions against Iran and its state enterprises,” and “to nullify all
attachments and judgments obtained therein. . . .”).
50. Id. at 666.
51. Id. at 667.
52. See id. at 677–78 (explaining that the IEEPA does not authorize the President to nullify
private claims in federal court).
53. In addition to IEEPA, the Court referenced the Hostage Act and the International
Claims Settlement Act to support the idea that Congress implicitly approved “the practice of
claim settlement by executive agreement.” Id. at 680. For reference, see Act of July 27, 1868, 22
U.S.C. § 1732 (1976) (the Hostage Act) (requiring the President to use any “necessary and
proper” means short of war and illegal acts to secure the release of an American hostage being
held by a foreign government); see also International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 22 U.S.C. §
1623 (2018) (creating a procedures for the federal government to settle claims by U.S. nationals
against foreign governments).
54. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 667.
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certain legal claims on behalf of U.S. citizens, the Court inferred
congressional approval in this instance.55
This tendency embodies one modern judicial approach to the
President’s national security power. In stark contrast to Youngstown,
when assessing the constitutionality of an executive action in the
national security space, the modern Court will examine any relevant
statutory delegations of power that may indicate congressional
acceptance of the executive action in question. Even without
congressional delegation to the President to pursue a specific action,
the Court is willing to examine all relevant statutory authorizations
from Congress to determine if there are indicia of congressional
acceptance in the circumstances similar to those presented in the case.56
Rather than seeking affirmative approval, when there is “no contrary
indication of legislative intent,”57 the Court will likely find the
President acted pursuant to the implied authorization of Congress.
Again, the Court revealed its extreme deference to the Executive
acting in the realm of foreign affairs and national security in Japan
Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society.58 There, the Court
considered statutory language surrounding the United States’
obligations under the International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling (“IWC”).59 Pursuant to its IWC obligations, Congress passed
a series of statues directing the Secretary of Commerce to certify when
foreign nations failed to comply with internationally established
whaling quotas.60 After the President refused to impose sanctions five
consecutive times following a certification from the Secretary of
55. See id. at 680 (“Crucial to our decision today is the conclusion that Congress has
implicitly approved the practice of claim settlement by executive agreement.”) (citing the
International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 22 U.S.C. § 1623 (2018)).
56. See id. at 667 (treating congressional silence as implicit approval and noting, “We think
both statutes [IEEPA and the Hostage Act] highly relevant in the looser sense of indicating
congressional acceptance of a broad scope for executive action in circumstances such as those
presented in this case.”). But see Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 526–27 (2008) (reading
congressional silence on the issue of whether the President has authority to implement an
International Court of Justice (ICJ) judgment as signaling congressional disapproval and failing
to search the U.S. Code for other indicia of Congressional approval).
57. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678–79; but see Medellín 552 U.S. at 527 (finding that, under
the Dames & Moore standard articulated above, that congressional silence indicated
congressional disapproval without any direct evidence of congressional disapproval).
58. 478 U.S. 22 (1986).
59. See id. at 225–26, 232–33 (considering a statute directing the Secretary of Commerce to
certify to the President if “nationals of a foreign country, directly or indirectly, are conducting
fishing operations in a manner or under circumstances which diminish the effectiveness of an
international fishery conservation program . . . .”).
60. Id.
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Commerce, Congress passed legislation requiring the President to
impose sanctions in response to the Secretary of Commerce’s
certification.61
Despite Congress’ mandate, the Executive Branch preferred to
resolve whaling disputes with Japan through diplomacy rather than
sanctions and reached a diplomatic agreement whereby the United
States agreed to classify Japan as a compliant nation under the relevant
statute.62 In an effort to validate the Reagan Administration’s
diplomatic solution, the Japan Whaling Court ignored the plain
language of the statute and held the statutory language does not
require the Secretary “to certify a nation that fails to conform to the
IWC whaling Schedule.”63 In this way, Japan Whaling reflects the
Court’s preference to defer to the President when legal questions
concern foreign affairs.64
II. IEEPA, FINANCIAL WARFARE, & PRESIDENTIAL POWER
Thus far, this Note has framed the legal landscape with respect to
the Executive’s national security power and emphasized the role of
congressional delegation and judicial deference in strengthening
executive power. Before turning to an analysis of the Xiaomi decision,
this Section will consider one congressional delegation of power that
has served as the Executive’s primary tool for declaring national
emergencies – the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
61. See id. at 226–27 (explaining that Congress initially allowed the President discretion to
impose sanctions on nations violating IWC obligations but, after the President refused to impose
sanctions five consecutive times following a certification from the Secretary of Commerce,
Congress “mandate[ed] the imposition of economic sanctions against offending nations”
following certification from the Secretary of Commerce.).
62. Id. at 227–28.
63. Id. at 226–27, 233 (quoting the statutory language directing the Secretary of Commerce
to monitor, investigate, and certify when a foreign country is conducting fishing operations that
“diminish the effectiveness of an international fishery conservation program,” but holding that
“the statutory language itself contains no direction to the Secretary, automatically and regardless
of the circumstances, to certify a nation that fails to conform to the IWC whaling Schedule.”); see
also David M. Driesen, The Congressional Role in International Environmental Law and Its
Implications for Statutory Interpretation, 19 B.C. ENV’T. AFF. L. REV. 287, 310 (1991) (explaining
that the Court “ignored clear legislative history showing that Congress intended the mandatory
imposition of sanctions for violations of international whaling quotas. . . .”).
64. See Driesen & Banks, supra note 17, at 1329 (“By basically ignoring the statutory
language and its history, it validated a diplomatic solution preferred by the Reagan
administration.”); see also Driesen, supra note 63, at 310 (“All commentators have agreed that
neither legislative history nor the words of the statute justified the extraordinary in this case.”);
but see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517 (2004) (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 602 (1952)) (holding President’s creation of military commissions was
contrary to several statutes and the Geneva Conventions)).
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(“IEEPA”). In providing an overview of IEEPA and the growing
importance of financial warfare, this Section will consider the benefits
of broad executive power in the national security realm.
A. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act
IEEPA empowers the President to regulate commerce—including
the power to prohibit, nullify, or block transactions65—in response to
“any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or
substantial part outside the United States, to the national security,
foreign policy, or economy of the United States.”66 While the statutory
text requires a threat to the national security or foreign policy of the
United States, IEEPA’s utility is trans-substantive and has been used
to address a variety of crises such as hostile foreign governments,
terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and transnational white-collar
crime.67
While some contemporary scholars argue IEEPA provides the
Executive Branch with too much unilateral authority, Congress passed
IEEPA in 1977 to limit the President’s overly expansive emergency
economic powers embodied in the Trading with the Enemy Act
(“TWEA”).68 TWEA provided the President with an “extraordinary
degree of control over international trade” during both peacetime and
wartime.69 To rein in executive power, Congress amended TWEA to
limit is applicability to wartime only,70 and enacted IEEPA to delegate
to the President “a new set of authorities for use in time of national
emergency which are both more limited in scope . . . and subject to
procedural limitations.”71 As part of its efforts to limit executive power,
Congress designed IEEPA to work in tandem with the National
Emergency Act (“NEA”)— creating robust procedural restraints on
the Executive’s powers under IEEPA.72
65. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B).
66. § 1701.
67. Brennan Center Report, supra note 2, at 3.
68. Trading With the Enemy Act, Pub. L. No. 65-91, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4341).
69. Congressional Research Report on IEEPA, supra note 4, at 3.
70. See Amendments to the Trading with the Enemy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, tit. I, 91 Stat.
1625, 1625 (1977) (“Section 5(b)(1) of the Trading With the Enemy Act is amended by striking
out ‘or during any other period of national emergency declared by the President’ in the text
preceding subparagraph (A).”).
71. Congressional Research Report on IEEPA, supra note 4, at 9.
72. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1702 (listing the procedural restraints of the President’s IEEPA
powers); see also H.R. Rep. No. 95-459 (1977) (explaining that presidential authority under
IEEPA is “subject to various procedural limitations, including those of the National Emergencies
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Procedural restraints on the President’s power to use IEEPA flow
from cross-cutting statutes and the statutory language of IEEPA itself.
First, presidents may exercise power granted to them by IEEPA only
when the President declares a national emergency under the
procedures set forth in the NEA.73 When declaring a national
emergency under IEEPA, the NEA requires the President to transmit
a proclamation declaring an emergency to both the public and
Congress by publishing the declaration in the Federal Register.74 The
NEA also requires the President to renew the predicate national
emergency required to exercise power under IEEPA through a notice
of renewal in the Federal Register.75 If the Executive Branch does not
issue a notice of renewal, the predicate national security emergency will
automatically end after one year.76 Further explored in Part III, the
procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
constrain executive action under IEEPA.77
In addition to the exogenous procedural requirements of crosscutting statutes, IEEPA creates additional formal constraints on the
President’s power. First, the President must confer with Congress “in
every possible instance” before acting pursuant to IEEPA.78 Second,
after declaring a national emergency under IEEPA, the President must
provide a report to Congress specifying the circumstances that pose an
unusual and extraordinary threat to U.S. national security or foreign
policy, and must include any foreign nations the Executive intends to
act against.79 Third, the President must submit “follow-up reports” to
Congress every six months detailing actions taken under IEEPA.80
The Executive must comply with the procedural requirements

Act”); see also Congressional Research Report on National Emergency Powers, supra note 15, at
8 (noting the NEA arose from a Congressional recommendation from the Church Committee for
“legislation establishing a procedure for the presidential declaration and congressional regulation
of a national emergency.”).
73. See Congressional Research Report on IEEPA, supra note 4, at 10 (“Presidents may
invoke IEEPA under the procedures set forth in the NEA.”).
74. 50 U.S.C. § 1621.
75. 50 U.S.C. § 1622.
76. Id.
77. See discussion infra Part III. For a preview of the intersection of executive national
security powers, IEEPA, and the APA, see generally Elena Chachko, Administrative National
Security, 108 GEO. L. REV. 1063, 1137 (noting that the APA provides “structural and functional
constraints on the President's control” in the national security realm “despite the President's
elevated role in foreign and security policy.”).
78. 50 U.S.C. § 1703(a).
79. Ibid. § 1703(b).
80. Ibid. § 1703(c).
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outlined above to exercise authority under IEEPA. But, if the formal
requirements are met, the Executive has broad authority to target
individuals, sovereign nations, and situations not involving a specific
target or state, such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons.81 Indeed,
echoing the legal principals in Dames & Moore v. Regan,82 the First
Circuit aptly described IEEPA as “codif[ying] Congress’s intent to
confer broad and flexible power upon the President to impose and
enforce economic sanctions against nations that the President deems a
threat to U.S. national security interests.”83 While IEEPA’s language
requires an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to the U.S. economy or
U.S. national security interests, the Executive Branch uses IEEPA as a
routine foreign policy tool, with “an average of 1.5 IEEPA emergencies
declared each year.”84 Given that Congress has the authority to
terminate the predicate national emergency that provides the
Executive with authority to act under IEEPA, Congress’ refusal to do
so suggests that the legislature approves of the systematic use of
IEEPA by the Executive Branch as a broad foreign policy tool.85
B. National Security and Financial Warfare
While some express concerns about the Executive’s broad power
under IEEPA,86 the statute has been a fixture in the United States’
post-9/11 national security strategy.87 As global power struggles
81. Ibid. § 1703(a)(1)(B) (showing that IEEPA allows the President, acting through the
Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC), to sanction and block the real property of natural and
legal persons); see also Chachko, supra note 77, at 1094 (citing Exec. Order No. 12,938, 59 Fed.
Reg. 58,099 (Nov. 14, 1994) (titled “Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”) (noting that
the Executive Branch has used IEEPA to target states such as Iran as well as “situations” such
like the proliferation of nuclear weapons)).
82. 453 U.S. 654, 674 (1981) (providing broad deference to the executive branch based on
the Congress’ statutory delegation of power through IEEPA).
83. United States v. McKeeve, 131 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Arch
Trading Co., 987 F.2d 1087, 1093–94 (4th Cir. 1993)).
84. Brennan Center Report, supra note 2, at 3; see also Congressional Research Report on
IEEPA, supra note 4, at 18 (“Each year since 1990, Presidents have issued roughly 4.5 executive
orders citing IEEPA and declared 1.5 new national emergencies citing IEEPA.”).
85. 50 U.S.C. § 1622 (2018) (noting that a national emergency may be terminated by a
privileged joint resolution of Congress); see also Elizabeth Goitein & Andrew Boyle, Limiting
This Governmental Emergency Power Could Curb Presidential Overreach, FORTUNE (Mar. 4,
2020), https://fortune.com/2020/03/04/national-emergency-foreign-sanctions-ieepa/ (“To date,
Congress has never attempted to terminate an IEEPA emergency.”); see also Brennan Center
Report, supra note 2, at 19 (noting that “Congress has largely approved of presidents’ uses of
IEEPA to date.”).
86. Brennan Center Report, supra note 2, at 3 (noting that IEEPA delegates “potent powers
with so few limits on discretion or institutional checks,” and arguing for reforms that would limit
IEEPA’s potential for abuse).
87. See Chachko, supra note 77, at 1095 (“Use of individualized economic sanctions
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increasingly play out in financial markets, as opposed to battle fields,
the United States has expanded its national security infrastructure to
include economic and financial warfare.88 Indeed, the modernization of
international financial markets and the growth of illicit finance has
made financial warfare a central tenant of the United States’ national
security strategy.89 Apart from classic sanctions or embargos, the
United States is leveraging global capital markets, banking, and
financial systems to attack enemies abroad—and it is relying on IEEPA
to do so.90
The previous four presidential administrations have relied on
IEEPA to apply financial pressure as part of the United States’ foreign
policy campaign against key adversaries such as Iran, Syria, North
Korea, and Russia.91 As early as 2006, President George W. Bush froze
assets of persons connected to the assassination of former Lebanese
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.92 Thereafter, President Barack Obama
issued a series of executive orders prohibiting investment, freezing
assets, and blocking transactions as part of the United States’ efforts
during the Syrian civil war against Iran and the Assad regime.93 In an
even more recent example, the United States blocked transactions with
and froze the assets of prominent Russian and Ukrainian individuals
involved in Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and imposed similar
accelerated following 9/11.”).
88. See Zarate, supra note 9, at 428 (explaining that “freezing bank accounts and seizing
cash at borders was a more palatable way of fighting terrorism than sending troops to warzones);
see also Bracken, supra note 9, at 689 (noting that “Financial warfare, as distinct from classic
economic warfare, is an expanding arena of conflict.”).
89. See Zarate, supra note 9, at ix (noting that the United States has “financially squeezed
and isolated America’s principal enemies of this period—Al Qaeda, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and
Syria.”).
90. See Chachko, supra note 77, at 1095 (“Since the early 2000s, there has been a steady
increase in the application of individual sanctions pursuant to the IEEPA and other authorities
in a host of policy areas.”).
91. Id. at 1095–98 (describing various executive orders using individual sanctions to
effectuate U.S. foreign policy goals).
92. See Exec. Order No. 13,399, 71 Fed. Reg. 25,059 (Apr. 25, 2006) (entitled “Blocking
Property of Additional Persons in Connection [w]ith the National Emergency [w]ith Respect to
Syria”).
93. See Exec. Order No. 13,606, 77 Fed. Reg. 24,571 (Apr. 22, 2012) (entitled “Blocking the
Property and Suspending Entry into the United States of Certain Persons [w]ith Respect to Grave
Human Rights Abuses by the Governments of Iran and Syria [v]ia Information Technology”);
Exec. Order No. 13,582, 76 Fed. Reg. 52,209 (Aug. 18, 2011) (entitled “Blocking Property of the
Government of Syria and Prohibiting Certain Transactions [w]ith Respect to Syria”); Exec. Order
No. 13,573, 76 Fed. Reg. 29,143 (May 18, 2011) (entitled “Blocking Property of Senior Officials
of the Government of Syria”); Exec. Order No. 13,572, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,787 (Apr. 29, 2011)
(entitled “Blocking Property of Certain Persons [w]ith Respect to Human Rights Abuses in
Syria”).
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individual sanctions on persons involved in the Russian effort to
undermine the 2016 Presidential election.94
Finally, Congress passed the Global Magnitsky Act in 2016 to
address both global corruption and human rights abuses through the
application of financial pressure.95 Congress again invoked IEEPA and
predicated the Executive’s authority to designate individuals under the
Magnitsky Act on IEEPA—enabling the President to use his power
under IEEPA against foreign persons who commit “gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights,” or engage in “significant
corruption.”96 Foreign persons currently designated under the
Magnitsky Act include Saudi Arabian officials who allegedly played a
role in the extrajudicial killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, six
current Chinese government officials accused of human rights abuses
in Xinjiang providence, and government officials from several nations
in Africa accused of human rights abuses.97
Despite the ubiquity of IEEPA in United States foreign policy, the
Executive Branch’s use of IEEPA presents a dilemma. On one hand,
IEEPA represents an incredibly effective foreign policy tool that serves
the United States’ national security interests. Indeed, according to
former Deputy National Security Advisor Juan Zarate, the United
States’ financial warfare campaign has ostracized America’s enemies
and is “unprecedented in its reach and effectiveness.”98 On the other
hand, critics argue IEEPA lacks appropriate procedural safeguards
given the Court’s general deference to the Executive acting pursuant
to national security and the institutional gridlock in Congress.99 The
remaining sections of this paper attempt to reconcile the need for
accountability with the equally pressing need to provide the Executive
Branch with foreign policy tools that enable the President to quickly
and flexibly leverage global capital markets for the benefit of the

94. See Exec. Order No. 13,685, 79 Fed. Reg. 77,357 (Dec. 19, 2014) (entitled “Blocking
Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting Certain Transactions [w]ith Respect to the Crimea
Region of Ukraine”); Exec. Order No. 13,757, 82 Fed. Reg. 1 (Dec. 28, 2016) (entitled “Taking
Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency [w]ith Respect to Significant Malicious
Cyber-Enabled Activities”).
95. Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 114-328 (2016).
96. MICHAEL A. WEBER & EDWARD J. COLLINS-CHASE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10576,
THE GLOBAL MAGNITSKY HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY ACT 1 (2020).
97. Id. at 2.
98. Zarate, supra note 9, at ix.
99. See Koh, supra note 14, at 1297–98 (arguing that, in the national security arena, Congress
has “consistently failed to check or restrain” the Executive “because of legislative myopia,
inadequate drafting, ineffective legislative tools, and an institutional absence of political will.”).
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United States’ national security interests.
III. THE XIAOMI CASE & JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER IEEPA
The Xiaomi case highlights the Executive’s vast power under
IEEPA, as well as the effectiveness of IEEPA’s procedural constrains
on executive power. This Section will use the Xiaomi case to argue that,
when paired with discerning judicial review, IEEPA as it is currently
written strikes a realistic balance between the need for adequate
Executive oversight and the necessity that the U.S. have effective
foreign policy tools.100
A. Legal and Factual Background
On November 17, 2020, then-President Donald Trump issued
Executive Order 13959, entitled “Addressing the Threat from
Securities Investments That Finance Communist Chinese Military
Companies.”101 The Executive Order declared a national emergency
with respect to the “unusual and extraordinary threat” posed by
China’s national strategy of “[m]ilitary-[c]ivil fusion,” by which the
Chinese government compels its civilian companies to support its
military and intelligence activities.102 The Order argued that these same
civilian companies “raise capital by selling securities to United States
investors” and thus concluded that the United States is inadvertently
financing “the development and modernization of [the PRC’s]
military.”103 EO 13959 was designed to protect the United States’
national security interests by prohibiting U.S. investment in select
Chinese companies involved in the development of “weapons of mass
destruction, advanced conventional weapons, and malicious cyberenabled actions against the United States and its people.”104
The Trump Administration resurrected an obscure section from the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 to sanction
Chinese companies.105 The relevant section—Section 1237 of NDAA
100. See Xiaomi Corp., v. Dep’t of Def., No. 21-280 (RC), 2021 WL 950144, at *5 (D.D.C.
Mar. 12, 2021).
101. See Exec. Order. No. 13,959, 85 Fed. Reg. 73,185 (Nov. 17, 2020) (entitled “Addressing
the Threat from Securities Investments That Finance Communist Chinese Military Companies”)
[hereinafter Executive Order Regarding CCMCs].
102. Id. (“Through the national strategy of Military-Civil Fusion, the PRC increases the size
of the country’s military-industrial complex by compelling civilian Chinese companies to support
its military and intelligence activities.”).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Xiaomi Corp., 2021 WL 950144, at *1 (“This suit concerns Xiaomi’s designation as
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1999—instructs the Secretary of Defense to publish a list of Communist
Chinese military companies (“CCMCs”) that “operate directly or
indirectly in the United States or any of its territories and
possessions.”106 CCMCs are defined as any company “owned or
controlled by, or affiliated with, the People’s Liberation Army or a
ministry of the government of the People’s Republic of China or that
is owned or controlled by an entity affiliated with the defense industrial
base of the People’s Republic of China.”107 Once a company is
designated a CCMC by the Department of Defense (“DoD”) under
Section 1237, the President may exercise his powers under IEEPA and
declare a national emergency with respect to the threat posed by
CCMCs.108 Thus, the President may sanction listed CCMCs, prohibit
United States persons from investing in CCMCs, and require
divestment from CCMCs.109
Section 1237 laid dormant for more than twenty years before the
DoD issued a list of CCMCs.110 The spontaneous revival of Section 1237
occurred after several legislators sent a letter to then-Defense
Secretary Mark Esper in 2019 calling on Esper to release a CCMC list
in compliance with Section 1237.111 In response to legislative prodding,
the DoD issued an initial list of twenty designated CCMCs in June
2020, predominately composed of technology and aviation companies,
but also notably including Chinese telecommunications giant
Huawei.112 On January 14, 2021, the DoD released the most recent
iteration of designated CCMCs, which included Xiaomi.113
Acting pursuant to IEEPA, President Trump issued EO 13959 and
prohibited “any transaction in publicly traded securities, or any
securities that are derivative of, or are designed to provide investment
exposure to such securities” involving identified CCMCs.114 Xiaomi, a
multinational consumer electronics company headquartered in China,
a CCMC under Section 1237 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999.”).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at *2.
109. See Executive Order Regarding CCMCs, supra note 101 (prohibiting “any transaction in
publicly traded securities, or any securities that are derivative of, or are designed to provide
investment exposure to such securities, of any Communist Chinese military company . . . .”).
110. Xiaomi Corp., 2021 WL 950144, at *3.
111. Jordan Brunner, Communist Chinese Military Companies and Section 1237: A Primer,
LAWFARE BLOG (Mar. 22, 2021, 8:01 AM) https://www.lawfareblog.com/communist-chinesemilitary-companies-and-section-1237-primer.
112. Id.
113. Xiaomi Corp., 2021 WL 950144, at *2.
114. See Executive Order Regarding CCMCs, supra note 101.
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was just one of several Chinese companies impacted by EO 13959.115 In
response to its designation as a CCMC, Xiaomi filed suit in the D.C.
District Court in January 2021.116
B. The D.C. District Court Opinion
Xiaomi challenged its designation as a CCMC under the
Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary and capricious standard.117 In
granting Xiaomi’s motion for a preliminary injunction, the court held
that the Department of Defense’s explanation for Xiaomi’s
designation as a CCMC was “inadequate” and that Xiaomi’s
designation lacked the required “substantial evidence” necessary to
fulfill the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard.118
As a threshold matter, while the President issues sanctions under
IEEPA, the Treasury Department is the executive branch agency
responsible for implementing sanctions under IEEPA.119 The APA
applies to all executive branch and independent agencies and
prescribes procedures for agency actions.120 Thus, courts review
sanctions promulgated by the Treasury Department pursuant to
IEEPA under the judicial review provisions of the APA.121 This is true
even for foreign national defendants such as Xiaomi. While not
automatically entitled to the full suite of due process rights provided
by the Constitution, foreign nationals retain the right to procedural
review under the APA.122
115. See Xiaomi Corp., 2021 WL 950144, at *3 (“On January 14, 2021, the Department of
Defense submitted to Congress, pursuant to Section 1237, a list of designated CCMC companies
that included Xiaomi.”).
116. Id.
117. Id. at *4.
118. Id. at *4, *7.
119. See Executive Order Regarding CCMCs, supra note 101, at 73,186 (“The Secretary of
the Treasury . . . is hereby authorized to take such actions . . . to carry out the purposes of this
order.”); see also Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 162 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (noting the Treasury Department implements IEEPA).
120. TODD GARVEY, A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING AND JUDICIAL REVIEW,
R41546, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 1 (2017) (explaining the APA applies to all executive branch and
independent agencies and proscribes the rules agencies must follow when making agency
rulemakings as well as the standards for judicial review of final agency actions).
121. See Holy Land Found. for Relief, 333 F.3d at 162 (noting that the actions of the Treasury
Department carrying out IEEPA sanctions “are governed by the judicial review provisions of the
APA.”).
122. See Rakhimov v. Gacki, No. CV 19-2554 (JEB), 2020 WL 1911561, at *6 (D.D.C. Apr.
20, 2020) (rejecting full due process for a foreign national sanctioned under IEEPA but holding
that the court must follow “the APA’s [5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)] ‘highly deferential standard,’
meaning that [it] may set aside Treasury’s action ‘only if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.’”) (quoting Zevallos v. Obama, 793 F.3d 106,
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Courts review agency decisions under a highly deferential standard,
and agency actions are struck down only if the action is “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.”123 Consistent with the Judiciary’s traditional deference to the
Executive in the realm of national security, courts afford heightened
deference to an agency’s determination in actions involving national
security.124 Still, the reviewing court must ensure the agency engaged in
reasoned decision-making.125 To fulfill the reasoned decision-making
requirement and meet the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard, an
agency must “articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action” with a
“rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.”126
In applying the reasoned decision-making standard, courts focus on
whether an agency action was supported by substantial evidence.127
Here, despite the deference built into APA review, the district court
held the DoD failed to articulate a satisfactory explanation supported
by substantial evidence for its decision to add Xiaomi to the CCMC list
and thus failed the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard.128 First, the
court concluded the DoD did not provide a reasoned decision for
adding Xiaomi to the CCMC list.129 The DoD’s proffered explanation
for classifying Xiaomi as a CCMC consisted of only two pages and
included the misquoted statutory language of Section 1237, two
business-related facts sourced from Xiaomi’s annual report, and a
conclusory statement that Xiaomi meets the threshold requirements
for CCMC designation as a company “owned or controlled by” the
Chinese government.130 Based on the insufficient evidentiary record,
the district court concluded Xiaomi’s designation was not sufficiently
reasoned and held the DoD circumvented the most “critical step” of an

112 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).
123. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
124. See Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 734 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(explaining that the court “is extremely deferential” when reviewing matters “at the intersection
of national security, foreign policy, and administrative law.”).
125. Xiaomi Corp., v. Dep’t of Def., No. 21-280 (RC), 2021 WL 950144, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar.
12, 2021) (quoting Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 53 (2011)).
126. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
127. See Xiaomi Corp., 2021 WL 950144, at *4 (explaining the agency makes reasoned
decisions when the agency’s final determination is “supported by substantial evidence.”) (quoting
Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 164 (1999)).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at *4–5.
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agency action by failing to “connect the facts to the conclusion.”131
Second, and relatedly, the district court found the DoD failed to
support Xiaomi’s designation to the CCMC list with “substantial
evidence.”132 Under the APA, the reviewing court must determine if the
agency supported its reasoned decision with “substantial evidence” on
the record.133 Here, the DoD relied on just two facts to designate
Xiaomi as a CCMC.134 First, the DoD pointed out that Xiaomi invested
heavily in technologies “essential to modern military operations” such
as 5G technology and artificial intelligence.135 Second, the DoD argued
Xiaomi had connections with the Chinese government because
Xiaomi’s founder and CEO received an award from the Chinese
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology entitled
“Outstanding Builder[] of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.”136
Based on these facts alone, the DoD said there was “adequate” support
for Xiaomi’s affiliation with the Chinese government.
The district court disagreed. First, the court said Xiaomi’s
investment in emerging technologies such as 5G and AI “cannot be
enough to support a conclusion that Xiaomi is a CCMC.”137 Such an
outcome, the court said, would create an opportunity for the DoD to
designate any Chinese company investing in technology with
alternative military uses as a CCMC.138 Second, the court
contextualized the “award” given to Xiaomi’s CEO based on evidence
provided by the plaintiffs that showed the award is granted to private
sector entrepreneurs in recognition of contributions to China’s
economic development.139 The court said the “purported link to the
Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology is also far
more tenuous than the Department of Defense implies.”140 In sum, the

131. Compare Xiaomi Corp., 2021 WL 950144, at *5 (describing that, in the case of Xiaomi,
the Department of Defense merely “parrot[ed]” the statutory language” of Section 1237 to
designate Xiaomi a CCMC without providing sufficient facts), with Holy Land Found. for Relief
& Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 161 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (noting that there was “ample” evidence
on the record showing that defendant HLF was involved in terrorism financing including (1)
HLF’s financial connects to Hamas, (2) members of HLF meeting with Hamas leaders, and (3)
HLF funds going to Hamas-controlled charitable organizations).
132. Xiaomi Corp., 2021 WL 950144, at *7.
133. Id. (quoting Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 164 (1999)).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at *8.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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district court concluded the DoD’s CCMC designation process with
respect to Xiaomi “was deeply flawed and failed to adhere to several
different APA requirements.”141
Notwithstanding the President’s robust power in the national
security realm, the Xiaomi decision reveals that the APA places
procedural constraints on the Executive when acting pursuant to
IEEPA. The final Section of this paper will assess and ultimately reject
various arguments for IEEPA reform and will use the Xiaomi decision
to argue IEEPA sensibly constrains the President when paired with
appropriate judicial review.
IV. IEEPA & ACCOUNTABILITY
Legal scholars and the public alike often reiterate concerns about
the Executive’s broad power under IEEPA and the perceived lack of
procedural safeguards on a President acting pursuant to IEEPA.142 As
a result, many have proposed potential reforms to IEEPA.143 This
Section will assess various criticisms of IEEPA and proposals for
IEEPA reform. This Section concludes by arguing that the existing
procedural constraints on the President acting pursuant to IEEPA,
when paired with appropriate judicial review, strike a reasonable
balance between ensuring accountability and maintaining an effective
and flexible foreign policy tool.
A. Proposed IEEPA Reforms
Most of the proposed reforms to IEEPA are procedural changes
intended to give Congress more supervision over the President acting
141. Id.
142. See Brennan Center Report, supra note 2, at 3 (noting that IEEPA delegates “potent
powers with so few limits on discretion or institutional checks,” and arguing for reforms that
would limit IEEPA’s potential for abuse);
see also Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal
Regime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1159, 1234 (1987) (noting that, while IEEPA is an improvement on
TWEA, IEEPA remains flawed because “Congress has very little to say about its use, and there
is no effective way to terminate a use that becomes inappropriate as time passes.”); see also
Elizabeth Goitein, The Alarming Scope of the President’ Emergency Powers, THE ATLANTIC (Jan.
2019)
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/01/presidential-emergencypowers/576418/ (arguing the president’s national security powers create a “Kafkaesque system”).
143. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L. J. 1029, 1077–81
(2004) (proposing reforms to IEEPA that would see emergencies automatically terminate after
two-to-three months); see also Peter Harrell, The Right Way To Reform the U.S. President’s
SECURITY
(Mar.
26,
2020).
International
Emergency
Powers,
JUST
https://www.justsecurity.org/69388/the-right-way-to-reform-the-u-s-presidents-internationalemergency-powers/ (proposing a requirement that Congress affirmatively approve IEEPA
sanctions).
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during a national emergency. As discussed in Part II, the existing
procedural constraints on the President when acting under IEEPA flow
from both cross-cutting statutes and the statutory language of IEEPA
itself.144 Specifically, IEEPA requires the President to follow the
procedures set forth in the NEA, notify Congress when declaring a
national emergency, publish the initial declaration of a national
emergency in the Federal Register, and publish renewals of the
predicate national emergency in the Federal Register annually.145
Further, IEEPA requires the President to issue periodic reports to
Congress after the initial declaration of a national emergency.146
Even so, critics argue Congress does not have sufficient supervision
over the President when acting under IEEPA. First, observers argue
both the annual renewal of national emergencies under the NEA and
periodic reports from the President to Congress have become pro
forma and do not represent meaningful oversight by Congress.147
Second, observers argue Congress does not have an efficient way of
terminating national emergencies.148 To the latter point, when Congress
passed IEEPA in 1977, the NEA permitted Congress to terminate the
predicate national emergency through a concurrent resolution without
the President’s signature.149 The Supreme Court held, however, this
oversight technique is unconstitutional in Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha.150 After Chadha, Congress replaced
the NEA’s concurrent resolution provision with a joint resolution
provision.151 The joint resolution provision requires a two-thirds vote in
both the Senate and the House of Representatives to be insulated from
the presidential veto power, making it difficult for Congress to
terminate national emergencies without a bipartisan majority.152

144. See infra, Part II (explaining the procedural restraints limiting the President’s power
under IEEPA).
145. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a)–(b); § 1622(d).
146. See infra, Part II (explaining the procedural restraints limiting the President’s power
under IEEPA).
147. See Harrell, supra note 143 (arguing both the renewals sent to Congress from the
President and the “periodic reports” have become “pro[]forma” and do not represent meaningful
oversight).
148. See id. (noting that the “U.S. Supreme Court effectively gutted Congress’s ability to
terminate national emergencies.”).
149. See Congressional Research Report on IEEPA, supra note 4, at 8, 11 (explaining that
prior to Chadha, Congress could terminate a national emergency via a concurrent resolution).
150. 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
151. 50 U.S.C. § 1622; see also Congressional Research Report on IEEPA, supra note 4, at 11
(explaining Congress replaced “concurrent resolution” with “joint resolution”).
152. Brennan Center Report, supra note 2, at 6.
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Based on the above criticisms, observers have proposed procedural
reforms to IEEPA that remedy the perceived lack of Congressional
oversight. Most importantly, reformers argue IEEPA should be
amended to include a sunset provision that would require Congress to
affirmatively approve sanctions under IEEPA after an initial period,
such as six months or a year after the President declared the national
emergency.153 Under the proposed reform, if Congress refused to
reauthorize the President’s IEEPA powers with respect to the given
national emergency, the predicate national emergency required for the
President to exercise power under IEEPA would terminate and the
President would not be permitted to use IEEPA to address the given
national security issue.154 Additionally, this procedural reform would
ensure Presidents use IEEPA for short-term national security issues
and would “restore the basic” pre-Chadha structure that Congress
intended.155 Without such reforms, critics argue IEEPA creates
opportunities for abuse and threatens the United States’ institutional
balance of power by ceding too much discretion to the Executive.156
Yet, reform must strike a balance between limiting IEEPA’s
potential for abuse and ensuring the United States has adequate tools
to respond to urgent foreign policy crises. While the above reform
would enhance accountability, the requirement that Congress
affirmatively approve the President’s use of IEEPA will have negative
practical consequences for United States national security.
B. IEEPA Reform & National Security
The above reforms detract from IEEPA’s utility as an effective and
flexible foreign policy tool. As discussed in Part II, IEEPA represents
an invaluable foreign policy instrument, particularly in an age defined
by the growing prominence of financial warfare. Sanctions, transaction
153. See sources cited supra note 143; see also Brennan Center Report, supra note 2, at 20
(“[I]f Congress does not affirmatively approve the use of IEEPA within 90 days [of the President
declaring a national emergency], the authority would terminate.”).
154. See Ackerman, supra note 143, at 1047 (arguing that, when the Executive act’s
unilaterally through a state of emergency, the Executive’s power should expire two or three
months); see Koh, supra note 14, at 1321 n.314 (arguing predicate national emergency should
expire after a set period of time).
155. See Harrell, supra note 143 (“Congress intended to give itself the authority to terminate
IEEPA actions with a simple majority vote.”).
156. See id. (explaining that “strong procedural checks and balances would improve oversight
[over IEEPA] and limit the scope for abuse.”); see also Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Norms
in a State of Permanent Emergency, 40 GA. L. REV. 699, 705–07 (2006) (explaining times of
“emergency” threaten the constitutional balance of power by providing too much power to the
executive).

WILLIAMS_FORMATTED_4.8.22 (DO NOT DELETE)

358

4/14/2022 11:36 AM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 17

blocking, asset freezing, and other IEEPA powers are intended to
impose financial pain on the United States’ adversaries—to deny
resources to nations, companies, or natural persons engaged in
activities that present national security threats to the United States.
IEEPA functions as a tool to address threats ranging from terrorism
financing to election interference, and even denies access to U.S. capital
markets for persons engaged in human rights abuses abroad.157
Yet, reforming IEEPA to require Congress to affirmatively
authorize sanctions after a set period will likely result in serious
national security threats going unaddressed. The political reality of
institutional gridlock that plagues the U.S. legislative system likely
means Congress would be unable to cobble together sufficient votes to
reauthorize the President’s IEEPA powers after the requisite amount
of time passed under the sunset provision, regardless of how dire the
national security crisis. This would make U.S. sanctions under IEEPA a
waiting game for foreign adversaries. Under the proposed reforms,
after the initial period during which the President could unilaterally
impose IEEPA sanctions passed, Congress would likely fail to
reauthorize the sanctions and foreign adversaries would be free to
engage with U.S. capital markets once more. Such an outcome would
make U.S. sanctions a slap on the wrist as opposed to a financial death
sentence—decreasing leverage of foreign adversaries that threaten U.S.
interests.
Additionally, advocates of IEEPA reform fail to specify what
procedures Congress would use to affirmatively authorize IEEPA
sanctions. Under the status quo, Congress may terminate the predicate
national emergency required for the President to act under IEEPA
through a joint resolution.158 While reformers argue that the joint
resolution represents too high of a bar for Congress to terminate a
national emergency under IEEPA,159 the inverse is equally
problematic.
Rather, if the amended IEEPA requires Congress to reauthorize a
predicate national emergency through a joint resolution, it will be
extremely difficult for Congress to enable the President to take
157. See sources cited supra notes 89–94 (describing the U.S. national security interests being
addressed through IEEPA).
158. 50 U.S.C. § 1622.
159. See sources cited supra notes 148–152; see Harrell, supra note 143 (“In today’s polarized
political system, it is extremely unlikely that two thirds [sic] of both houses of Congress will vote
to override the almost certain presidential veto of legislation terminating a national emergency.”).
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emergency action under IEEPA—even when such emergency action is
needed, effective, and beneficial to U.S. foreign policy interests. Given
the reality of congressional gridlock, changing the standard to require
Congress to affirmatively support IEEPA sanctions through a joint
resolution maintains the same unattainable voting standard but stunts
the Executive’s ability to protect the United States’ national security
interests.
C. Judicial Review as Adequate Oversight on Executive Power
IEEPA represents a carefully crafted legislative regime that
engages all three branches of government. In passing IEEPA, Congress
delegated authority to the Executive Branch subject to the procedural
requirements found in IEEPA itself, the NEA, and the APA.
Meanwhile, the Judiciary ensures the Executive remains within the
confines of its delegated power and limits the Executive’s national
security power when acting pursuant to IEEPA.
Rather than calling for legislative reform that will negatively impact
the United States’ ability to respond to national security threats, the
Xiaomi decision shows proper judicial review under the Administrative
Procedure Act operates as a powerful constraint on the Executive’s
national security powers when acting under IEEPA.
To the extent there is distrust in the President or fear of Executive
Branch abuse of IEEPA, judicial review under the APA provides
adequate oversight. The APA provides foreign persons with an avenue
for contesting their designation under IEEPA in federal court. As
Xiaomi demonstrates, the Executive Branch—even when acting
pursuant to national security—must present a reasoned decision with
substantial evidence to show a foreign national should be sanctioned
under IEEPA. Further, foreign persons targeted under IEEPA may
present evidence in federal court to rebut the Treasury Department’s
sanctions against them. The federal judiciary, particularly the D.C.
district court, should continue to use administrative national security
law to restrain the Executive Branch acting pursuant to IEEPA. Unlike
congressional reform, addressing any oversight concerns through a
more active judiciary maintains the Executive’s access to an important
foreign policy tool while providing remedies on a case-by-case basis.
Importantly, the aftermath of the Xiaomi decision supports the
notion that judicial review acts as an effective constraint on the
Executive’s national security powers. After the D.C. district court
granted Xiaomi’s motion for a preliminary injunction, the DoD
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removed Xiaomi from the CCMC list and the Treasury discontinued
any sanctions it previously levied at Xiaomi under IEEPA.160
Additionally, the Xiaomi case does not stand alone. In May 2021, the
D.C. district court again enjoined the Executive Branch from
classifying another Chinese company, Luokung Technology
Corporation, as a CCMC and subjecting the company to IEEPA
sanctions.161 After assessing a nearly identical set of facts to those in
Xiaomi, the district court again held the government failed to provide
a reasoned decision for classifying Luokung as a CCMC.162 These cases
show the APA and the federal judiciary are effective mechanisms to
challenge and constrain the Executive when acting pursuant to IEEPA.
V. CONCLUSION
As global conflicts increasingly play out in financial markets,
administrative national security law represents a sensible constraint on
the President while still enabling the Executive to respond to national
security crises. Motivated by practical political concerns, this Note
rejects IEEPA reforms that require Congress to affirmatively approve
executive actions under IEEPA. Instead, as the Xiaomi decision shows,
IEEPA’s existing statutory accountability mechanisms, when paired
with proper judicial review under the APA, are sufficient constraints on
the President’s IEEPA powers.
However, other IEEPA reforms that do not hinder the Executive’s
ability to respond to foreign policy threats should be considered. For
example, Congress could require the Executive Branch to provide
more information about sanctions levied under IEEPA, such as a
thorough explanation of the sanctions’ goals and criteria the sanctioned
entity must comply with for the sanctions to be removed.163 These
reforms ensure more congressional accountability without denying the
Executive the speed and flexibility required to wield global capital
markets as an effective foreign policy tool.

160. Sophie Jin & Antonia I. Tzinova, U.S. Removes Xiaomi from List of Banned Chinese
&
KNIGHT
ALERT
(May
27,
2021)
Companies,
HOLLAND
https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2021/05/us-removes-xiaomi-from-list-ofbanned-chinese-companies.
161. Luokung Tech. Corp., v. Dep’t of Def, 538 F. Supp. 3d 174, 178 (D.D.C. May 5, 2021).
162. Id. at 188.
163. Harrell, supra note 143.

